Philosophy of education: Learning and schooling by Morshead, Richard W.
R i c h a r d  W.  M o r s h e a d  
book with a style that few, if any in our field or any field can 
match. It is only his in,terpretation of parts of ,the substance of 
the matter that evokes this reply. 
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I 
As a rule, philosophers of education, especially those in- 
volved in ordinary language analysis, are not primarily noted for 
their work in aesthetics. This is not to say that they lack any 
genuine interest in the arts or that they are in particular need 
of cultural enlightenment. Nor, is it to suggest that, somehow, 
they are not intellectually or temperamentally up to dealing with 
the subject matter involved. Instead, it is merely to point up the 
unfortunate fact that many frankly do not see any real or tenable 
relation between inquiries into art theory and the explication 
of educational concepts. The two activities are viewed as being 
largely, if not totally, uneonneeted. 
Now, whether this particular state .of affairs merely reflects 
some generalized popular sentiment about the alleged frivolous- 
ness of artistic pursuits or, instead, represents a more carefully 
weighed and responsible determination, is difficult to say. In 
speeifie eases, I suppose, one argument could prevail over the 
other. Undoubtedly, there are those who simply have not put 
much thought to the matter, letting the zeal of ,certain highly 
vocal educational reformers earry the day. And with equal likeli- 
hood, there are probably others who, after serious consideration, 
still fail to discern any way in which inquiry into aesthetics could 
be of any substantial benefit to the clarification of educational 
theory. In either case, however, the result has been the same: 
the work of analytic philosophers .of education has been remark- 
amy lacking in its attention to the materials ,of aesthetics. 
Of course, there are a few individuals who have persistently 
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held out against this prevailing circumstance. 1 Among them 
has been The University of Wisconsin's Donald Amstine. In 
numerous articles and papers, over the last decade, he has re- 
peatedly explored the possible role of aesthetic concepts in educa- 
tional .thought. This year, however, he has provided us with his 
first book, Philosophy of Education: Learning and Schooling. 
In a variety of respects, it is a fine volume. Like many 
contemporary British philosophers, Arnstine writes about ordinary 
language in ordinary language. Considering the fact that many 
of the concepts with which he deals ,turn out to be rather com- 
plex, this is no easy task. Still, he brings it off nicely. His book 
is refreshingly readable. Throughout, he has included numerous 
suramaries in an effort to enhance continuity at those points 
where there otherwise might appear to be some trace of dis- 
jointedness. And his use of examples and pictorial illustrations, 
especially when treating the more substantive materials of art 
criticism, is certainly valuable. Those individuals, then, having 
little more than a passing familiarity with art and art theory., 
need have no fear that they will not be: able to follow the various 
arguments with relative ease. 
But it would be a serious mistake to characterize this book 
as simply a text in aesthetics. Although ample space is devoted 
to the analysis and assessment of art theory, Professor Arnstine's 
chief aim in writing the volume is obviously much wider than 
this. Broadly, he has undertaken a critical .examination of various 
teaching practices and the particular learning theories upon 
which they are said to be based. This, when taken together with 
his own proposals for the reconstruction of both theory and 
practice, then, provides the reader with a fairly comprehensive 
look at many of the issues currently attracting attention in phi- 
losophy of educa~on. 
I I  
Beginning with a systematic exploration of the concept of 
learning, Arnstine concludes that our customary ways of formu- 
lating it are seriously wanting. According to him, it is quite 
inappropriate for educators to identify learning with either 
changes in overt behavior or the acquisition of knowledge, skills, 
habits, and attitudes. (pp. 11-81) Although all of these, ,at times, 
may be involved, none of them, taken individually or collectively, 
1 Several among these are Harry S. Broudy, Nathaniel L. Champlin, David W. 
Ecker, and Francis T. Villemain. 
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truly characterize the kind of outcomes aimed at in schooling 
practices. It is only when students alter or adopt dispositions, 
he argues, that we can legitimately claim learning has occurred. 
(p. 40) For him, then, learning can be most correctly thought of, 
in the educational arena at least, as dispositional acquisition. 
No,v, a disposition, as Professor .Arnstine reminds us, is not 
a thing or an object of any sort. ,Nor is it a set of either overt 
or covert behaviors. R.ather, in the :case of human beings, it is a 
trait of character that is accorded to someone. It is, as it were, 
a tendency to act in a certain way. To ascribe a particular dis- 
position to an individual is to make a prediction about the kind 
of behavior we .can expect from him under certain conditions. 
(p. 82) It is, in the words ~of Ryle, a "law-like" principle. 2 
But not all dispositions, warns Arnstine, are appropriate for 
schools to foster. Some may do more to incapacitate us than to 
assist us. Those that are desirable, on the other and, allow us to 
provide for the .continued acquisition of still more dispositions. 
Much like Dewey, then, Professor Arnstine is suggesting here 
that the ethical features ,of curriculum are to be largely shaped 
by the notion that learr6ng ought .to, lead to more learning and 
that growth shonId occur for the sake of growth. (pp. 847-48) 
If schools, however, are to. effectively pursue this end, the 
theories of learning which support teaching practices must be 
appropriately suited to the task. Therefore, Arnstine argues, those 
learning theories advocated by various ego-psychologists, stressing 
the inherent growth potential of the self, are clearly inadequate. 
(pp. 86-87) Not only do they commit thek ,adherents to an 
untenable mind-body :dualism but .they also provide little concrete 
help for the classroom teacher interested in achieving specific 
curricular objectives. Behaviorism, for all its virtues, fares little 
better in his view. Its emphasis upon operant conditioning not 
only fails to provide teachers with need.ed predictions for the 
selection of app.ropriate reinforcers but  also tends to promote 
student conduct that is blindly habitual and quite similar to the 
behavior aimed at in indoctrination. Moreover, when taken as a 
generalized psychological theory, it is totally incapable of dealing 
with private events like pains and aspirations that no one else 
can observe. Either such events are reduced to statements about 
overt behavior or else they are considered scientifically useless. 
But, as Arnstine reminds us, to: experier~ee a repo~ or a sign of 
pain is not the same as experiencing the pain itself. Any theory 
2 Gilbert Ryle, THE CONCEPT OF MINO (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 
1949), p. 89. 
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which suggests that the two .experiences are the same is clearly 
misleading us. (p. 98) 
In order to properly explain learning, therefore, Arnstine 
proposes that we view human eonduct as a product of environ- 
mental interaction rather than as' the maturation of some internal 
ghostly ,entity or as the piecemeal accumulation of conditioned 
responses. Mind, for him then, is not an entity or a collection of 
molecular behaviors. It is an operation. It emerges whenever 
" . . .  one .set of events fnnotions in such a way as to irtdicate, 
stand for, or point to some other set of events that is neither 
immediately present nor immediately forthcoming." (p. 114) Thus, 
any change in disposition involves, among other things, an active 
change in mind. This can oeeur, he eontends, only as meanings, 
intentions and expectations also alter. In a manner of speaking, 
these constitute the "stuff" of mind. Whenever there is a m od- 
ifieation of disposition, then, there must be a change in these. 
Such changes are initiated, according to Arnstine, by the 
perception of discrepancies. (p. 818) They come about as we 
sense some emerging variation in our experience that challenges 
our expectations. If, however, the discrepancy from expectation 
is slight, i.t probably will go urmotioed and leaaxdng will fail to 
occur. If it is gross or extensive, on the ottmr hand, it may only 
serve to shock and immobilize thought. Thus, not all perceived 
discrepancies :are necessarily capable of instituting learning. Only 
those that fall someplace between these two extremes, Arnstine 
argues, ,are usually suitable for this purpose. (p. 800) 
The pereeption of these intea-mediate discrepancies, we are 
then told, can give rise to learning under any of three somewhat 
different conditions. (p. 295) First, if an obstacle appears in the 
course of goal seeking conduct, its interferenee may bring about 
the beginning of problem so,lying activity. Second, if something 
novel is encountered within a familiar context, cu~osity may 
issue and give .rise to either speeutat~ma or scientifie inquiry. 
And, third, if a patterned relation of sensuous elemel~ts is per- 
ceived, an aesthetic experience may result and he pursued to the 
point that it is finally appreciated. Although it may be rare to 
find any of these occurrences totally separated from one another 
in our everyday experiences, Arnstine indicates it is of value to 
analy~e and understand eaeh individually. This is especially true 
for the teacher, he says, because i,t is the teacher's responsibility 
to initiate and develop such discrepancy situations in his pro- 
fessional work. (p. 826) 
However, in order to oonserve space here, perhaps we can 
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,capture the substance of 'these three conditions for learning, 
while not .doing severe injury to Professor Arnstine's overall 
intent, by merely focusing our attention upon his analysis of 
discrepancy perception in aesthetic experience. Since, in his own 
view, there is a very close relation between any experience from 
which learning emerges and any experience which is aesthetic 
in quali.ty, (p. 222) such an approach .does not seem to be 
injudicious ,o'r .out of order. Besides, this is one ,of the most 
interesting and rewarding analyses ,contained with'm his book. 
For Arnstine, the perception .of form is an intrinsic feature 
.of any aesthetic experience. This is nos to say, however, that 
form is to be taken .as the single defining characteristic of an art 
object. Many such objects, paintings, and pho~ographs for 
example, provide viewers with much more than simply this. They 
give us certain representations, .often called "subject matter," 
that call to mind Various experiences we have had with objects 
and events which are not :l!~erally in the artistie rendering itself. 
Nevertheless, the pereeptioK' of form does play a signifieant role 
in any attempt to identify experience that is essentially aesthetic 
in quality. 
When form is dis.eerned, various ordered relations among 
the nortrepresen.tative elements of sensuous materials are pe."- 
ceived. But, aeeording ~o Professor Arnstine, this is not all. The 
perception of form also involves the immediate arousal of emotion 
or affect. (p. 186) In fact, it is this instantaneous emotional 
impact that permits us to. detect the presence of an aesthetic 
quality in our experiences. Aesthetic .qualities, then, are not 
viewed by Arnstine as being properties of art objeets. Instead, 
they are features of our experience. They are nothing other than 
directly felt perceptions of form. 
Now, in saying this, Arnstir~e warns us that it is probably 
inaccurate to characterize such affeetive responses as emotions. 
Emotions, such as fear or anger, usually carry with them a 
qualitative content of their own and, in addition, are mainly 
directed toward specific entities or events. The experience of 
aesthetic quality, however, generally is not as particularized. Its 
impact is simply one .of excitation. For .this reason, then, he feels 
it is better to refer to such a response as "affect" rather than as 
"emotion." (p. 189) 
Affect, he contends, aceompanies all perceptions. It is as 
it were, as much a part of perception as is meaning. However, 
when something quite familiar is perceived, atfeet as well as 
meaning may be slight. But when that which is perceived is not 
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so well known, both affect and meaning are increased. This is 
because the occurrence .of affect and meaning, as elements of 
perception, involve expectations .about what might be perce'ived 
next. If a situation is somewhat unfamiliar in that expectations 
are delayed or otherwise blocked, affect increases while new 
meanings are sought. And, ff the discrepancy between that which 
is perceived and that which is expected is not gross or extensive, 
the consequent affect can be positive in value. That is to say, 
it can be pleasant or satisfying. (pp. 202-10) The experience, 
,then, is said to be prized for its own sake and is sought after 
and cherished. 
When representation is present in an art object, say houses 
depicted in a painting, an additional dimension is included in 
our perception of the object. An element .of some kind which 
functions by ~referring to something other than itself has been 
incorporated. Now, according to Arnstine, ff this is all that occurs, 
aesthetic quality is not enhanced. But, if the representation makes 
us aware of events and values not in the object itself while yet 
allowing o ~  attention to remain focused on the formal elements 
of the object, aesthetic quality is increased. (p. 219) This occurs 
because such "reflexive signs," as he, calls them, make the impact 
of affect more pointedly specific. It begins to take on the features 
of emotion. 
Although much of this might appear to be rather abstract, 
Arnstine argues that it can be of invaluable practical aid to the 
teacher. The dramatic increase in positive affect, or enjoyable 
involvement, that may attend the perception of form comple- 
mented by eontent, he points .out, can give schooling practices a 
striking aesthetic impact. Lessons, lectures, and reading ma- 
terials, if designed with an eye to the perception of both form 
(style) and content, rather than simply content alone, can bring 
about highly charged motivations on the part of the student. 
Tkese, because they are intrinsic, .can be expected to fare much 
better ,than extrinsic motivations, based upon such things as 
grades and threats, in facilitating disposi, tional changes. (pp. 
227-56) 
However, ff teachers are ,to initiate such changes, Anastine 
insists that they must be properly prepared and must be given 
the freedom to pursue the means that can achieve this end. 
Among Other things, he feels this means that teacher education 
programs .ought to provide unique courses in the arts that can 
assist in making prospective teachers more aware of the aesthetic 
potential of all that they undertake in the classroom. (pp. 258-59) 
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In addition, he believes that it is the teacher who ought to be 
designated as the one in the educational community to select 
and mold the content of the courses which are to. be taught. 
(pp. 862.-67) Much like Lieberman, then, he would place the 
larger part .of responsibility for developing curricula in the hands 
of teachers. To recognize their authority in this matter, he con- 
.eludes, is to reeognize their importance in the schooling process. 
(p. 864) 
i l l  
It should be fairly apparent by now that in this book, 
Professor Arnstine has attempted to. forge a new and distinctive 
concept .of learning: ,one that will be of particular service and 
'help to teachers. In doing so., moreover, he has attempted to 
steer a mid-course between ego.-psychology and behaviorism. 
Yet, when he is through, I for one come away with the general 
.conviction that, in this latter ,effort at least, he has not been al- 
together successful. 
As I see it, Arnstine's difllculties h e r  stem from the fact 
that, in large measure, his c.onelusions concerning learning seem 
to be inconsistent with 'his categorical rejection of behaviorim. 
He feels that in treating learning as a change in disposition, he 
somehow has not treated it behaviorally. That is, he feels he has 
successfully avoided dealing with it in a manner which reflects 
the basic methodology of behavioristie psychology. In this, how- 
ever, I believe he is thoroughly mistaken. Quite frankly, I do 
not really see where .any :empirical study of 'human dispositions, 
whether it be Anlstine's .or anyone else's, can be anything but 
compatible with contemporary behaviorism. 
As Professor Arnstine, himself, has' so skillfully and care- 
fully pointed out, dispositions are not independent entities. They 
do not have an existence of their own above and beyond ,that of 
human behavior. Instead, they are merely law-like statements 
that .can be used in predicting and characterizing the kind of 
behavior we might expeet from different people under different 
circumstances. Tha~ they may be used, .on oeeasion, to forecast 
an experience for which an individual may show no overt signs, 
does not negate the point I ,am trying to make. The fact that a 
particular experience, a slight pain for example, is not publicly 
signaled, does not mean fhat, in principle at least, it would be 
impossible for us to provide the circumstances for the occurrence 
of such a signal. 
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The only way, therefore, to: argue: for Arnstine's view, and 
.conclude that learning is truly incapable of being handled within 
the  theoretical framework of behaviorism, is to claim that there 
are experiences for which there n e v e r  can .occur any .overt signals. 
This, however, would be a difficult claim to support. In order to 
test such an hypothesis, in any particular case, it first would 
be necessary to .establish what telltale signals would appear in 
the event it were wrong. In doing this we would be denying the 
very thing we wanted to prove. We would have established that 
it is logically possibte for the l~rivate event under consideration 
to be publicly signaled. The whole argument is clearly self- 
defeating. 
This ,criticism of Arnstine's approach, however, is not to 
deny the occurrence .of private mental .?vents. Nor is it to suggest 
that such events are .always accompanied by .overt signs or signals. 
Instead, it is merely to emphasize that there is nothing about 
such .events that, inherently, precludes them from being signaled 
publicly and, likewise, nothing in dispositional statements, pro- 
dieting the occurrence .of these events, that necessarily calls for 
the blanket dismissal of behaviorism. 
But it would be unfair for me to. suggest that Professor 
Arnstine's a~titude toward behaviorism in psychology is totally 
unfounded, Those social scientists who would serio.usly contend 
that private mental events are either illusions or else are indis- 
tinguis.hable from .overt acts, .certainly deserve the: treatment he 
gives them. For my part, I am quite pleased to see that he has 
so carefully exposed, for what it is, some .of the naive mechanistic 
thought often found underlying various theories of operant con- 
ditioning and programmed instruction. However, in pursuing the 
shortcomings ,of these theories Arnstine seems ~o have made an 
error of his .own. In fact, it is his central error. He has identified 
the logic of contemporary beaviorism with the logic supporting a 
kind of reductive materialism. 'He has erroneously eoneluded 
that since behaviorists study .only behavior they must necessarily 
deny the occurrence of private mental events. 
Such an .outlook is simply incorrect. While it is true that 
behaviorists do not study private mental events, as such, there 
is nothing in theft approach that prohibits them from taking 
either statements about such events or the behavior accompanying 
tl~e events and using ~:is as objective data. Since data of this 
type is no different in structure than any other data collected by 
behavioral researchers, it is of no less value in its importance. 
In this respect, then, it .can be used with equal force in formulat- 
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ing psychological generalizations and hypotheses. In fact, of all 
the data we have concerning other individuals, it constitutes the 
sole source of information we 'have about their personally felt 
experiences. Thus, I fail to understand how the use of this data, 
in this manner, can be equated with a refusal to recognize the 
existence .of private mental events. Nor do I see where: it can be 
taken to imply a redu,etion of such events to some so-called 
"behavioral equivalents." 
It  is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that  behaviorism as a 
methodological  or ientat ion (as distinct from behaviorism as some part icular  
substantive theory of h u m a n  behavior) is not  inherent ly  inadequa:te to the 
study of purposive  h u m a n  action, and that  in consequence the repeated claims 
asserting .the essential inappropr ia teness  of a behavioristic approach to the 
su.bject mat te r  of the social sciences rest on no  f i rm foundations.3 
The final observations I want to make here have to do with 
Professor Arnstine's theory of art. It will be remembered that, 
for him, aesthetic quality is to be thought of as a directly felt 
perception of form. Because this always involves the arousal of 
affect, however, an experience having aesthetic quality always 
has an immediate subjective impact. In a sense, it is emotionally 
charged. And, as a result, it can begin .to take on positive over- 
tones when it is sensed to be pleasant or satisfying. If this occurs, 
the experience is viewed as being of worth and, in one way or 
a nother, it is desired or pursued. 
With little doubt, some might find ,it very tempting at this 
point to characterize Arnstine as a hedonist. Certainly, some of 
that which he proposes does appear, upon first inspection, to 
support such a conclusion. His concern with pleasure and enjoy- 
ment, as elements of aesthetic experience, could ,easily be inter- 
preted as features of a general hedonistic outlook. Nevertheless, 
I do not believe this charge, as such, can be legitimately directed 
toward 'him. Since his primary interest in this book is with 
theories of learning and schooling, his treatment of art reflects 
this and, as a consequence, does not extend directly to matters 
of art criticism. Thus, his rather detailed accounts of the emotion- 
like characteristics of aesthetic experiences do not necessarily 
constitute his criteria for the aesthetic appraisal of art objects. 
They are simply his explanations ,of the way in which experiences 
having aesthetic quality can be utilized in achieving dispositional 
changes. 
3 Ernest Nagel, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, Inc., 1961), p. 480. 
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This does not mean, however, that everything Arnstine has 
had to say about aesthetic quality is closed to question. Although 
he is certainly correct in contending that aesthetic quality is found 
only within experience, I think he is quite mistaken when he 
assigns such quality to the experiencing subjec.t rather than to 
the .experienced object. By placing it here, so to speak, tie fashions 
a context within which the experiencing subject must be included 
as an object in the identification .of any work of art. Attention, 
then, is shifted away from .tke art object, itself, and .turned 
toward the various psychologically described responses of the 
perceiving subject. What began as an aesthetic analysis has now 
become a psychological inquiry .of sorts. What is and what is 
not an art .object, is left to a ,clinical assessment of an individual's 
emotional fancy. 
Now, I am quite sure that Professor Arnstine is not uuaware 
of .this difficulty. Perhaps he has chosen to. live with it, however, 
so that he would have some procedure at his disposal ~or clearly 
distinguishing those experiences .that are aesthetic from those are 
not. If so, I believe he has an ,entirely erroneous view .of the way 
we ordinarily go about characterizing the qualities of our ex- 
periences. We label an experience "frightening," '%appy," or 
"sad," for example, not because it is occasioned by some object 
or event we have encountered, but because we, 'have .a,etually 
been frightened, happy, .or sad. That ,is, we have been in a given 
state, behaving and thinking in a particular manner, and have 
labeled the experience accordingly. The qualities of experience, 
then are not named after the .ob}ects we experience. Neither are 
they named after the various disciplines we pursue, in our 
scholarly endeavors. Hence, it makes little sense to talk about 
psychological experiences, physics .experiences, or history experi- 
ences unless, of course, reference is being made in some oblique 
way to. an encounter with the. theory, methodology, or practice 
of these fields. And, likewise, I would think, it makes just as 
little sense to speak of an aesthetic experience or an aesthetic 
quality of experience. 
This, of course, is not to suggest that it is at all inappropriate 
to speak of experiencing .certain qualities which we might want 
to label ",aesthetic." Under such circumstances, however, the 
qualities involved would be assigned to the experienced object. 
They would be considered features of the art work. And as such, 
they would be qualities that are experienced rather than qualities 
o) ~ experience. 
If, then, Professor Arnstine would have assigned aesthetic 
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qualities to the objects of experience instead of characterizing 
certain experiences as being aesthetic in quality, these difficulties 
may not have appeared. Such a tact, however, may have sub- 
stantially altered Ms entire thesis. And this, he may feel, is not 
at all .desirable. 
To be sure, many would agree with him. Much that he has 
said, especially about ego-psychology and reductive behaviorism, 101 
ltas needed saying for far too long a period of time. His crit- 
icisms of various current school practices are to the point and 
well done. And, his contention that our customary ways of 
viewing learning leave much t.o be desired, is exceptionally well 
supported and most deserving of our attention. All this, and 
aesthetics too. Indeed, .even with my own reservations about 
several of his arguments, how can I do anything but commend 
Professor Arnstine for giving us this very good book. 
D O N A L D  A R N S T I N E ' S  
R E P L Y  T O  
R I C H A R D  W .  M O R S H E A D  
Richard Morshead has done in his review all that the most 
sanguine author could ask. He has read the book carefully, 
interpreted it in a manner sympathetic to the author's emphases, 
and he has articulated his disagreements with clarity and with 
courtesy. For all this I am grateful. I shall try to respond in kind 
to what I take to be two salient criticisms discussed in section 
III of his review. 
Professor Morshead writes that my discussion of learning as 
a change in disposition mistakenly tried to avoid employing the 
methodology os behavioristic psychology. In fact, he does not 
see "where any empirical study of human dispositions . . . can 
be anything but  compatible with contemporary behaviorism." In 
support of his views, he has cited Ernest Nagel, who defends 
behaviorism as a methodological orientation ("as distinct from 
behaviorism as some particular substantive theory of human 
behavior"). 
Since, as Professor Morshead allows, a disposition is not 
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behavior at all, there seems to be something odd about a 
behaviorist studying dispositions. We can get to the bottom of 
this puzzle, and perhaps see more clearly whether and to what 
extent Professor Morshead and I disagree, by examining Nagel's 
distinction between behaviorism as (a) a methodological orienta- 
tion, and (b) a substantive theory of human behavior. This 
distinction is a false one, and it results in mischief for those who 
would keep their behavioral research "pure." 
One could, of course, be called a "behaviorist" if he simply 
limited his research to the study of that which is observable. 
In this broad (but  unusual) sense of the term, there are more 
"behaviorists" in 'the field of education (including myself) than 
we know. But ,as the term, behaviorist, is normally used in 
educational and psychological discourse, it refers to that general 
psychological approach adopted by investigators such as J. B. 
Watson, Clark Hull, E. R. Guthrie, B. F. Skinner, and Kenneth 
W. Spence. For these men, no distinction can be found between 
behaviorism considered ~as a methodological orientation, and 
considered as a substantive theory of behavior. In observing men 
and animals, these investigators have assumed that the beahvior 
observed is in fact a response to some stimulus. That is, it is 
presupposed that the occurrence of the action seen is to be 
explained as being contingent on some prior cue. stimulus or 
some subsequent reinforcing stimulus. Yet despite such assump- 
tions, behavior does not present itself to us with a label already 
on it. If it is to be called a "response" (with all that the term 
connotes), then that is the label the investigator gives to the 
behavior. It is not what he "finds." Thus the "methodological 
orientation" (i.e., the study of contingencies holding between 
stimuli and responses) of the: behaviorism of Hull, Skinner, 
Spence, et al, is very much a function of ,a particular substantive 
theory of human behavior (i.e., that the actions of men are 
responses contingent Oil specifiable stimuli). 
In the stimulus-response view of human behavior, the 
acquisition of new behavior (learning) is a case of conditioning: 
a change in response strength or the acquisition of a new response. 
A habit is formed; that is, a particular response becomes con- 
tingent on a particul,ar stimulus. The study of men's habits is 
indeed important, but all human action is not just habitual. The 
behavioristic approach, then, is either limited to studying only 
one way in which humans behave, or it leads the investigator to 
insist that all human behavior is habitual. It must b e  concluded, 
then, that such an orientation is either inadequate for the study 
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of education (for habits are not all that it is hoped learners will 
acquire), or it is false (for habits are not all that learners can 
acquire ). 
In Philosophy of Education: Learning and Schooling, I tried 
to make explicit (pp. 26ff, 31-39) some important distinctions 
between the kind of behavior we call habitual and the kind we 
refer to as the exercise of a disposition. A disposition is not an 103 
action ,at all, but is, colloquially, a tendency to act in certain ways 
in certain kinds of situations. The exercise of a disposition 
includes a range of actions which can be characterized but never 
fully specified. In contrast, a habit is a particular response or 
set of responses that can be expected to occur in a given situation. 
The exercise of a disposition is not so predictable (indeed, some 
people are even characterized as "unpredictable;" so to describe 
a person is to ascribe a disposition to him). Since the behavior 
about which dispositiorral statements are made is not fully specifi- 
able in advance, it not bound to specific stimuli, and is therefore 
markedly distinct from habitual behavior, it is not amenable to 
study or to being explained by methods which presuppose all 
human action to be wholly stimulus-bound and therefore habitual. 
Behaviorism of the sort under consideration, then, cannot 
study dispositions, nor oan it be of help in teaching, insofar as 
teaching is concerned with students' acquiring dispositions (and 
not merely habits). Instead, a behavioristic emphasis in teaching 
and in educational research tends to ignore the possibility and 
the value of dispositional changes in students, ,and emphasizes the 
development of habits ,and the use of conditioning techniques like 
programming and extrinsic rewards. Such an emphasis, which 
assumes that all children can acquire is habits, underestimates 
the capacities of children and may have disastrous social 
consequences. 
It is because of an inability to deal with dispositions that 
behavioristically oriented psychologists and educators, when con- 
fronted with educational goals stated in disposdtional terms, 
impatiently demand that they be "translated" into behavioral 
terms. They are stymied if asked how best to teach a child to be 
courteous, although they can offer specific techniques for teaching 
(i.e., conditioning) children to say "please" whenever they ask 
for something, and "thank yon" whenever they receive something. 
Yet uttering such words on cue is not a translation of courtesy 
into behavioral terms. People's dispositions are formed as a 
concomitant of their interactions with (not reactions to) others, 
and they are either disposed to be courteous or they are not. 
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Only professional behaviorists or small children would recognize 
others as courteous or discourteous by the frequency with which 
they uttered "please" and "thank you. "1 
If, on the other hand, "behaviorism" is taken only to suggest 
a mode of understanding human behavior by the observation of 
what men do, and by limiting all explanations to what can reason- 
ably be inferred from what has been observed, and to what has 
eventual reference to what can be observed, then I would surely 
endorse behaviorism. But it was not my understanding that this 
was ordinarily connoted by that term. 
I !  
Professor Morshead's reservations abou t  the conception of 
art presented in Philosophy of Education: Learning and Schooling 
are different in kind from those discussed above. For while his 
discussion of behaviorism suggested inconsistencies in my thought, 
his suggestion that my views on aesthetics are mistaken appears to 
be based on an alternative aesthetic theory of his own. The 
various questions he raises in this area, then, all have a common 
focus which makes them particularly interesting to deal with. 
I believe they can all be tied together in the following sort of 
objection to what I have proposed: If aesthetic quality is to 
be ascribed to the experience of the viewer, then the identification 
of what is a work of art no longer is a matter of aesthetic analysis, 
but rather is a matter for psychological inquiry. Aesthetic qualities, 
on the contrary, belong to the object, and we may or may not 
experience them, depending on our training and sensitivity. 
Professor Morshead's objection is clearly put, but I find 
unconvincing the metaphysics on which it is based, and the 
practical consequences to which it leads. It is easy .enough to 
assign simple qualities, like colors, to objects, although a change 
in lighting conditions would remind any observer that the color 
is as much a function of the light upon the object as it is of 
the object itself. An aesthetic quality would appear far more 
subtle than a simple one like color. Yet if the redness cannot 
simply be called a property that belongs (wholly) to the object, 
how could the "aestheficness" be? Again, I can paint a wall red. 
Can I as straightforwardly paint it "aesthetic'? Finally, the color 
1 For similar reasons, John Passmore has observed that being critical -- another 
kl.nd of disposition -- is more than uttering, "1 question that!" to the assertions of 
others, and even more than being able to respond correctly to all the exercises in 
Max Black's CRITICAL THINKING. See "On Teaching to be Critical," in R. S. Peters 
(ed.), THE CONCEPT O'F EDUCATION (New York: Humanities Press, 1967). 
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of an object in a given light can be ascertained with full agree- 
ment by all who investigate who are competent to do so. Can 
the aesthetic quality of an object be similarly ascertained? Not 
at all. John Canaday ,and Thomas B. Hess are both competent 
observers, but they decidedly do not find the same aesthetic 
qualities in the same objects. 
If, .as I have maintained, aesthetic quality is not a property 
of objects, neither is it simply in the eye of the beholder. Mr. 
Canaday's and Mr. Hess's judgments are not just the fortuitous 
outpourings of different personalities. In the book, I argued that 
aesthetic quality was a characteristic of the experience of the 
viewer, dependent both on his particular background and on 
describable (not mysteriously "aesthetic") features of that which 
he was perceiving. Does this mean, as Professor Morshead 
suggests, that aesthetic analysis is reduced to clinical inquiry? I 
think not. It is always necessary to ask, what were the features 
of the obj.ect with which the observer (on the basis of his 
background) interacted. 
Aesthetic analysis is ill-advised to attempt to determine, 
for all tirne, which objects have what "aesthetic qualities." Instead, 
it will suffice to ask, what kinds of describable formal arrange- 
ments and symbolic associations will have an impact on per- 
cipients of a given degree of experience and familiarity? (This, 
I maintained, was a crucial question for effective teaching in 
any subject area.) If such an approach does not enable us to 
divide the furniture of the world into those things that are works 
of art and those that ,are not, then so much the worse for those 
whose labels are licked and have no place to paste them. 
Whether or not we choose to call a thing a work of art 
(be it a wristwatch or a milk bottle drying rack), there is no 
reason why, under certain conditions, we should not be able to 
experience it aesthetically. As Professor Morshead reasonably 
says, this does not mean that we can label certain sorts of 
experience as "aesthetic" ones. But contrary to Professor Mers- 
bead's additional claim, it does not seem unreasonable to me to 
say that any experience may have, to a greater or lesseer degree, 
aesthetic quality. 
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